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Few topics bedevil more law students than the law of present and
future interests. With the goal of eliminating some of the confusion,
this Article highlights the basic doctrine with a new set of diagrams to
represent graphically how various interests behave.' This Article
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1. If you need more details and have a favorite text, return to it. If not, consider these
specialized sources: THOMAS P. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1966); ROBERT LAURENCE & PAMELA B. MINZNER, A STUDENT'S
GUIDE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1981); JOHN MAKDISI, ESTATES IN
LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1991); CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962); LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLEN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1994); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1993).
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opens with a question many students ask and then proceeds to the core
concepts in the law of present and future interests.
I. WHY BOTHER?
Many students, confronted with a seemingly impenetrable mass
of concepts developed in the Middle Ages, reasonably ask why they
should bother to learn this stuff. A practical reason for studying
present and future interests is that these concepts are the basic building
blocks for estate plans. Even if the names of the interests fade from
your memory, the ideas they represent will be crucial to your abilities
both to present estate planning choices to your clients and to draft
documents that fulfill those clients' wishes. Moreover, even the odd-
sounding names themselves are important, for they provide the vehicle
for communication among lawyers, courts, and legislatures about these
concepts. Law reform is in the air. Reform is not possible, however,
unless we all understand what we are talking about.
A broader reason for studying this material stems from law
schools' mission of training people to analyze legal problems, irrespec-
tive of the particular subject matter. The law is full of densely tangled
topics, and learning how to handle those topics takes practice. The law
of present and future interests provides an excellent opportunity for
getting that practice: The law in this area is complicated, presents
unfamiliar terminology, and requires attention to detail. At the same
time, however, a basic understanding of the topic's core concepts is
manageable within the confines of a law school course. Thus, a study
of this topic affords students an opportunity to develop skills useful for
a professional lifetime.
II. PRESENT V. FUTURE INTERESTS: DIVIDING TIME
The law of present and future interests originally developed to
meet the needs of landowners. Although these concepts now apply
most often to personal property held in trust, viewing the question in
terms of land can help students understand the fundamentals. First,
the law separates the notion of ownership from the thing owned. We
As you study the endless examples available, beware of learning to recognize various interests
without really understanding how those interests operate. One way to test your understanding
is to draft your own language and then figure out what interests you have created.
The idea of using graphs extensively seems to have originated with Professors Dukeminier
and Johanson. For a recent version, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 632-40 (4th ed. 1990). For a presentation using charts, see Robert J.
Hopperton, Teaching Present and Future Interests: A Methodology for Students that Unifies Estates
in Land Concepts, Structures, and Principles, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 621 (1995).
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own "interests" in land, rather than the dirt itself. Second, the law
allows us to divide our interests among different people, according to
when they have the right to use the land. Third, the law treats these
individual interests as if they were things in themselves. We give these
interests unique characteristics and speak as if they behave in various
ways.
The biggest, most complete interest is the fee simple absolute. If
Howard owns a fee simple absolute interest in a house, he owns an
interest that extends forward in time for infinity. Suppose Howard
died owning the property. His fee simple absolute would not end just
because he died. Rather, his fee simple would go to someone else,
either by intestacy or by will. Assuming that Howard did not divide
his interest, the recipient would get exactly what Howard had, an
interest extending forward in time for infinity.
Suppose, however, Howard left a will dividing the ownership: He
gave Ethel the right to use the house during her lifetime and Andrew
the right to use the house after Ethel's death. Howard's will created
both a present interest and a future interest. Because Ethel can use the
house now, she has what we call a present interest.' However, Ethel's
interest is smaller than Howard's was, for Ethel's interest ends at her
death. Because Andrew's interest will entitle him (or someone else3)
to use the house after Ethel's death, we say Andrew has a future
interest. Future interests are not things people get in the future.
Rather, they are things people own in the present, but which carry a
right of possession in the future. Owning a future interest is somewhat
like owning a ticket to next week's concert.
Future interests are really just present interests pushed into the
future. When Ethel dies, whoever holds Andrew's interest will be able
to use the land and will have a present interest. In the scenario here,
what is now Andrew's future interest will become a fee simple absolute
2. Perhaps it helps to imagine a house with a front porch and a rocking chair. The holder
of the present interest at any given time has the right to sit in that chair.
3. We might refer to these others as Andrew's "successors." "Successors" is not a term of
art; it simply means those people who take what Andrew had. If Andrew died owning the
interest, it would pass under his will or by intestacy. He might also have transferred it to
someone else before he died.
Most future interests are fully transferable. However, some jurisdictions limit the methods
by which certain kinds of future interests may be transferred. See, e.g., Goodwine State Bank v.
Mullins, 625 N.E.2d 1056 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (contingent remainder not transferable by
quitclaim deed), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 4 (Ill. 1994); 2A RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK
J. RONAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 275[2]-[3] (1995) (rights of entry and possibilities
of reverter not transferable except by release in some states). Creditors' rights in future interests
closely track the transferability rules. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 1, §§ 1921-1927.
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because no one else holds an interest in the property. In other
situations, what was once a future interest will become a present
interest followed by additional future interests. When considering a
future interest, look for two labels: on the outside is the term
identifying the type of future interest; hidden inside, however, is a
present interest waiting to appear.3
The notion of dividing ownership according to time allowed
modern trust law to develop. In place of Ethel's right to use the
house, we give her the right to receive income from a trust. In place
of Andrew's right to use the house next, we give him a right to
distribution of the trust principal after Ethel's death. Because the
trustee holds legal title, Ethel and Andrew have equitable interests, but
these interests behave in much the same way as the legal interests that
were invented centuries ago.
III. PRESENT INTERESTS
To recognize that individuals were trying to do different things
when they divided their property according to time, the common law
invented a series of different present interests and gave them different
characteristics. This section introduces these various interests and
offers a graphic depiction of each to capture their principal attributes
in visual form.
A. Fee Simple Absolute
In terms of dividing ownership according to time, the fee simple
absolute is everything. (See Figure 1).
4. For example, Howard might have given the property to Ethel for her life and then to
Andrew for his life. Because Andrew's interest will end at his death, his interest must be followed
by another future interest (a reversion).
5. It may help to think of sets of hollow dolls or jars or nutshells, one placed inside another.
When you open one, you find another one, and so on.
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FIGURE 1
Fee Simple Absolute
At common law, deed drafters seeking to create this interest had to use
words like, "To Suzanne and her heirs."6  The "and her heirs" (or"and his heirs") language was critical. Courts interpreted those words
not as words of purchase indicating who got the property (Suzanne's
heirs got nothing from such a grant); rather, courts treated the magic
words as words of limitation describing the estate granted. The words"and her heirs" came to indicate a grantor's intention to give an estate
that would extend beyond the grantee's lifetime and go on forever.7
The requirement of including the "and her heirs" language is
almost dead, and this Article will not include it in future examples.8
However, the distinction between words of purchase, which indicate
takers, and words of limitation, which identify those takers' interests,
remains an important part of document interpretation.
6. For two reasons, this Article avoids using the abstract "A" and "B" in favor of using real
names. First, using names underscores that real families create and own these interests. Second,
using names may help students move from working with abstract formulae to real documents that
use names.
7. Interestingly, the words were not required to pass a fee simple by will.
8. At common law, a grant "to Suzanne," without more, would give her only a life estate.
However, because following the common law rule would defeat the intentions of most people,
modern courts would give Suzanne a fee simple absolute.
Sometimes the old rules can affect modem cases. For a recent example, see Burk v. State,
607 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 600 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio 1992). Burk involved
an 1852 grant of land to the State to be used for two "Lunatic Asylums." Id. at 912. The deed
also provided that when the land ceased to be used for that purpose, "the same shall revert to the
grantors." Id. In 1988, the State dosed the facilities and sought to sell the land. Relatives of the
grantors appeared, claiming the land under the reverter language. Applying the law of 1852, the
court held that because the deed had not reserved an interest to the grantors and their heirs, the
possibility of reverter was in effect only during the grantors' lives. Id. at 914.
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B. Defeasible Fees
Sometimes grantors want to give property so that the interest can,
but need not, go on forever. Defeasible fee simple estates have that
feature. They are still fee simple estates because they can go on
forever, but they are "defeasible" because they can be lost. Although
defeasible fees generally are not used in estate planning, it is important
to understand their underlying concepts. 9 Particularly important is the
distinction between the two ways in which a defeasible fee simple ends:
expiration and divestment.
Expiration can happen if the grantor has placed a limit on the
grant. For example, Shannon might give property "to the School
Board so long as the land is used as a school." The School Board
might keep the property forever, but if they stop using it as a school
their ownership will end. Language like, "so long as," "while," and
"until" is called "limitational" language because it limits the estate
from the start. When used in conjunction with a fee simple's potential
for infinite duration, limitational language creates a fee simple determi-
nable. To indicate the limitational nature of a fee simple determinable,
Figure 2 shows it as an empty circle.
To account for the fact that Shannon did not say what would
happen to the property if it ceased to be used as a school, we would
say she retained a future interest called a possibility of reverter,1"
indicated by the arrow in Figure 2. If the School Board's fee simple
determinable expired, Shannon would have a fee simple absolute,
represented by the solid circle inside the arrow.
9. Defeasible fees sometimes are used to control land uses. See Gerald Korngold, For
Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 TEX. L. REV.
533 (1988).
10. Future interests are discussed in greater detail later in this Article, see infra text
accompanying notes 25-69; however, this discussion of present interests requires a reference to
the corresponding future interest for the sake of completeness and clarity.
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FIGURE 2
Fee Simple Determinable and Possibility of Reverter
A fee simple determinable can also be followed by an interest in
someone other than the grantor. For example, Shannon might have
said, "To the School Board so long as it is used for a school, and if the
property ceases to be used for a school, to Beneth if she is then living."
The Board still has a fee simple determinable, but we call Beneth's
interest an executory interest. The dashed arrow in Figure 3 indicates
that an executory interest is contingent, and the solid circle shows that
if Beneth takes, she will have a fee simple absolute.
FIGURE 3
Fee Simple Determinable Followed by an
Executory Interest
The other way for a defeasible fee simple to end is by being
divested, or cut short. This result is possible if the grantor has used"conditional" language such as, "but if'; "provided, however"; or "on
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the condition that." The law recognizes two types of defeasible fees
that are subject to being divested. Which label we use depends upon
who holds the future interest that follows.
If the grantor retains the future interest, we call the present
interest a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The grantor's
accompanying future interest is called a right of entry." Thus, if
Shannon gives property "to the School Board, but if the property is not
used as a school, then I reserve the right to reenter and take possession
of the property," the School Board has a fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent, illustrated by the cross-hatched circle in Figure
4. Shannon has retained a right of entry, indicated by the arrow. If
the Board stops using the property for a school and Shannon decides
to exercise her right, she will have a fee simple absolute.
FIGURE 4
Fee Simple Subject to a Condition
Subsequent and Right of Entry
/ 1
--------
If someone other than the grantor has the future interest following
a defeasible fee created by conditional language, we call the present
interest a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. The accompany-
ing future interest is an executory interest. Thus, if Shannon gives
property "to the School Board, but if the property is not used as a
school, then to Beneth if she is then living," the School Board has a fee
simple subject to an executory limitation, illustrated by the cross-
hatched circle in Figure 5.
11. Sometimes the term "power of termination" is used.
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FIGURE 5
Fee Simple Subject to an Executory
Limitation and Executory Interest
I 0 --.
Beneth still has an executory interest. In this case, if the Board stops
using the property for a school, Beneth's executory interest will
automatically divest the Board's interest, giving her a fee simple
absolute. This time the executory interest arrow points in toward the
present interest, indicating that Beneth's interest might divest the
Board's interest.
To identify what type of defeasible fee simple estate has been
created, apply a two-part test as of the time of the grant. First, ask:
Is the language limitational (so long as, etc.) or conditional (but if,
etc.)? If the language is limitational, the present estate is a fee simple
determinable. If the language is conditional, ask the second question:
Who holds the future interest? If the future interest is retained by the
grantor, then the present interest is a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent. If the future interest is given to a third party, then the
present interest is a fee simple subject to an executory limitation.
The distinction between an estate that expires and one that is
subject to divestment can be important. Consider two of the above
examples. In Figure 3, the School Board has a fee simple determina-
ble, which is followed by Beneth's executory interest. In Figure 5, the
Board has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and Beneth
has an executory interest. In each case, Beneth must survive in order
to take. Suppose Beneth dies and then the Board stops using the
property for a school. If the Board initially had a fee simple determi-
1995]
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nable, its interest expires when it stops using the property for a school
because its interest was good only "so long as" there was a school.
Because Beneth did not meet the condition of surviving, the property
will revert back to Shannon. 2  On the other hand, if the Board
initially had a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, its interest
becomes a fee simple absolute when Beneth dies because there is no
one around to divest its interest. The Board's later violation of the
condition is irrelevant.
C. Life Estate
The life estate is probably the favorite estate of law students. It
is both easy to recognize and easy to understand. If Cletus gives
property "to Helen for life," Helen has a life estate. If the property is
realty, Helen has the right to possession during her lifetime.13 If the
gift is in trust, Helen usually will have a right to trust income during
her life. Figure 6 illustrates the life estate as an empty square. The
square is empty because the life estate, like the fee simple determina-
ble, expires. Because Cletus did not identify who should take the
property after Helen, we say he retained a "reversionary interest." In
this case, Cletus's reversionary interest is called a reversion, which is
illustrated by the arrow. The solid circle inside the arrow indicates
that when Cletus's reversion becomes possessory on Helen's death, it
will become a fee simple absolute. If Cletus had identified third
12. Most authorities discuss this question in the context of an executory interest that fails
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. For a classic case, see First Universalist Soc'y of N. Adams
v. Boland, 29 N.E. 524 (Mass. 1892). In Boland, a grantor created a deed in 1854 that conveyed
real estate to a religious society so long as the land was used for religious purposes. Id. at 524.
The deed also stated that if the land stopped being used for religious purposes, it was then to go
to designated persons. Id. The court held that the 1854 deed conveyed a fee simple determinable
and that the executory interest that followed was void for remoteness. Id. Therefore, the grantor
retained a possibility of a reverter. and the religious society did not have a fee simple absolute.
Id. See generally SIMES & SMITH, supra note 1, § 1241.
In the context of a perpetuities violation, the Second Restatement suggests that an invalid
executory interest should leave a fee simple absolute, even when the present interest was a fee
simple determinable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.4 cmt. b (1936 & Supp.
1995).
The text followed the convention of most authorities and did not account for the grantor's
possibility of reverter when first identifying the interests created by this grant. Perhaps we should
identify both the executory interest and the possibility of reverter by analogy to contingent
remainders and reversions. For more on the relationship between those latter interests, see infra
text accompanying notes 54-56.
13. A legal life estate, like the one envisioned in the text, is useful only in rare circumstances.
In almost all other situations, creating a trust and giving the beneficiary an equitable life estate
will meet client needs while avoiding the problems created by dividing the legal estate. For
further discussion, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 233-34 (3d ed. 1993).
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parties to take after Helen's death, they would have had remainders,
which are detailed below. 4
FIGURE 6
Life Estate and Reversion
Not all life estates are as uncluttered as the standard example.
Grantors can also create life estates that may end before the death of
the life tenant. Like defeasible fees, these life estates can either expire
or be divested." If Cletus says, "To Helen for life or until she
remarries," he is creating a life estate determinable, sometimes called
a life estate subject to a special limitation. 6 Helen's interest can now
expire either of two ways: her remarriage or her death. Figure 7 adds
a diamond inside the life estate square to indicate the double limita-
tions on Helen's interest. Cletus retains a reversion. 7  Life estates
14. See infra text accompanying notes 30-69.
15. If you find the examples in this paragraph difficult, review the discussion of parallel
defeasible fee estates. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
16. The general limitation is being alive. The special limitation is the requirement to stay
single.
17. There is some disagreement about whether the grantor also retains a possibility of
reverter to account for the possibility of a shortened life estate. The standard view is that Cletus
retains a reversion, defined as the interest retained by a grantor who transfers a lesser quantum
than he already had. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.18 (A. James Casner ed., 1952);
BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 56-59; 2A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 3, 271. Since
Cletus had a (potentially infinite) fee simple and only gave away a life estate, he kept a reversion,
albeit one that could take in two circumstances.
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can also be subject to divestment, either by a right of entry 8 or by an
executory interest.19
Life Estate
FIGURE 7
Determinable and Reversion
A more complicated life estate is one that a grantor creates for one
person, good for the life of another. For example, Cletus might give
property "to Helen for the life of Menelaus."
18. Cletus could give property "to Helen for life, but if Helen remarries, the grantor may
reenter." In that case, Helen would have a life estate subject to a condition subsequent. Cletus
would have a right of entry (during Helen's life) and a reversion.
19. Cletus could give property "to Helen for life, but if Helen remarries, then to Joanna at
that time, and, in any case to Joanna after Helen's death." Helen would then have a life estate
subject to an executory limitation. Joanna would have an executory interest (during Helen's life)
and a remainder.
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FIGURE 8
Life Estate for the Life of
Another and Reversion
Helen has a life estate for the life of another, illustrated in Figure 8 by
the letter "M" in the square." When Menelaus dies, Helen's estate
ends.21
D. Fee Tail
At common law, if a grantor gave land "to Kelly and the heirs of
her body," Kelly would have a fee tail.2 That interest would then
pass to her children, their children, and so on until the death of Kelly's
last descendant. At that point, ownership would either come back to
the grantor (who retained a reversion) or move on to someone else
identified in the original document (who would have a remainder).
Because the fee tail promoted family dynasties and interfered with the
marketability of land, virtually all states have abolished it.23
Recognizing a fee tail and understanding the basic notion of an
estate moving with the generations are important for two reasons.
First, old wills or lay-drafted wills sometimes use the "heirs of the
body" language. You need to know to check the applicable local
20. Traditional terminology would call Helen's interest a "life estate pur autre vie."
21. Alternatively, Helen could have obtained such an interest if Menelaus had a life estate
for his own life, and he then gave it to Helen. She would get what he had, a life estate for
Menelaus' life.
22. For a brief history, see BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 28-34.
23. Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island still recognize a fee tail, but allow
any current "tenant in tail" to convert the estate into a fee simple absolute. See DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 13, at 214.
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statute to see what interests those words create.24 Second, documents
sometimes include language like, "and if Kelly dies without issue, to
Mark." Interpreting the "dies without issue" language is easier if you
understand the fee tail.
IV. FUTURE INTERESTS
As we have seen, the system of estates allows grantors to divide
ownership in terms of time. When creating a future interest, grantors
can either retain rights in the property or give pieces of the future
interest to various beneficiaries. This section first reminds you of the
interests grantors can retain, and then discusses the future interests
grantees own.
A. In the Grantor
Interests retained by a grantor are called "reversionary" interests.
There are three: a possibility of reverter, a right of entry, and a
reversion. A possibility of reverter follows a fee simple determinable.
A right of entry (sometimes also called a power of termination) follows
a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. Because defeasible fees
seldom have any part in estate plans, their accompanying reversionary
interests seldom appear. The third interest, a reversion, is important
to estate planners. It is the interest a grantor retains if he creates only
a life estate, or a life estate and contingent remainders. Because
modern estate plans regularly create life estates and contingent
remainders in trust, reversions are often present.
B. In Grantees
Grantees can hold two kinds of future interests: executory
interests and remainders. The practical differences between them may
be minimal,25 but our common language maintains both labels. One
way to help distinguish between the two categories is by assigning each
a personality characteristic. Executory interests are aggressive; they go
around cutting short other interests-they have hatchets. In contrast,
remainders are patient; they snuggle up against a present interest and
wait for its natural expiration-they have pillows.
24. A good starting place is 2A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 3, 198. Some states create
life estates, and other states create fee simple estates of varying kinds.
25. See J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for
the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REV. 13, 14 (1958).
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1. Executory Interests
Executory interests are future interests held by third-party
grantees.2" Executory interests usually take over by divesting prior
interests. Developed after the Statute of Uses in 1536,27 executory
interests made possible the fee simple subject to an executory
limitation.28 They also allowed a third party to take following a fee
simple determinable. This latter situation is the one exception to the
rule that executory interests take possession by divesting. Because a
fee simple determinable expires on its own, the executory interest has
nothing to divest.2 9 In all other cases, however, executory interests
take by divesting.
2. Remainders
Like executory interests, remainders are future interests held by
third-party grantees. Rather than divesting,3" however, they usually
wait for the expiration of a life estate.3 Remainders come in two
types: vested and contingent.
a. Vested Remainders
A remainder is "vested" if it satisfies three tests. First, the holder
of the remainder must be someone who has been born. Second, that
person must be identified. Third, there can be no express or implied
condition precedent to that person taking.32 Once a remainder jumps
26. The first party is the grantor, and the second party is the holder of the present interest.
27. For brief histories of these developments, see BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 80-
115; MOYNIHAN, supra note 1, at 171-206.
28. In this situation, traditional descriptions would say the present interest is subject to a
shifting executory interest because someday the legal title may shift from one grantee (who holds
the present interest) to a second one (who holds the future interest). Executory interests can also
be of the springing variety, jumping out of the grantor to start in the future. For example, Jessica
would have a springing executory interest if a grant read, "to Jessica when she graduates from
college." Because the distinction has little, if any, modern importance, it is falling into disuse.
29. Here the executory interest acts just like a remainder, waiting for the natural termination
of the prior estate. Common law judges could not call it a remainder, however, because by the
time it came along, the definitions of remainders were carved in stone.
For a discussion of the distinction between present interests subject to divestment and present
interests subject to expiration, see supra text accompanying note 12.
30. The one exception is that when contingent remainders vest in interest, they divest the
reversion.
31. Remainders can also follow a fee tail. For a brief review of the fee tail, see supra text
accompanying notes 22-24.
32. Reforms proposed by the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) would drastically reduce the
number of vested remainders created. The UPC would impose a condition of survivorship on
future interests under the terms of a trust. 8 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b) (Supp. 1995).
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through these hoops, the question remains: What type of vested
remainder is it? There are three: indefeasibly vested, subject to
complete defeasance, and subject to open.
i. Indefeasibly Vested
Just as a fee simple is the biggest interest, an indefeasibly vested
remainder is the biggest remainder. It is really just a fee simple
absolute pushed into the future. Suppose Joseph's will gives property"to Rose for life, remainder to Barbara." Rose has a life estate, shown
as a square in Figure 9, and Barbara has an indefeasibly vested
remainder, shown by the triangle. The solid lines indicate that the
remainder is vested, and the solid circle inside indicates that someday
it will become a fee simple absolute.33
FIGURE 9
Life Estate and Indefeasibly
Vested Remainder
ii. Subject to Complete Defeasance
Just as a fee simple can be defeasible, so can a vested remainder.
Many vested remainders subject to complete defeasance are really just
defeasible fees pushed into the future. Others are life estates in future
Because the remainders are subject to a condition precedent, they are contingent. Grantors can
overcome the presumption of required survivorship, but only with specific language. See
generally, ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS & ESTATES § 43[B][2][c][iii] (1994);
Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders, 94 MICH. L. REV.
148 (1995).
33. Under traditional rules, if Barbara survived Joseph but died before Rose, Barbara's
remainder would pass to Barbara's successors, who would then take at Rose's death. These rules
may change. See supra note 32.
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garb. Like their present interest counterparts, these remainders can
end either by expiration or by divestment. By convention, we do not
usually distinguish between the various sub-categories of vested
remainders subject to complete defeasance. If it helps you, however,
you certainly may refer to them by more detailed descriptions.34
Suppose Shannon leaves the farm "to Warren for life, then to the
School Board so long as it uses the land for school purposes." As
Figure 10 illustrates, Warren has a life estate, the Board has a vested
remainder subject to complete defeasance, and Shannon has a
possibility of reverter.3"
FIGURE 10
Life Estate and Vested Remainder Subject
to Complete Defeasance (Expiration)
If Shannon had said, "to Warren for life, then to the School Board, but
if the land is not used as a school, then to Beneth if she is then living,"
the Board still would have a vested remainder subject to complete
defeasance." 6 Beneth would have an executory interest, (See Figure
11.)
34. Consider the following descriptions: "a vested remainder in a fee simple determinable"
or "a vested remainder in a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent" or "a vested remainder
in a fee simple subject to an executory limitation."35. Compare Figure 2.
36. In this instance, it would be a vested remainder subject to complete divestment.
Defeasance is the broader term, and divestment, the narrower one.
Often remainders anticipate possible divestment during the pending life estate. For example,If Sanon had said to rJohn, but if he predeeases Marjorie, to Planned Parenthood."
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FIGURE 11
Life Estate and Vested Remainder Subject to
Complete Defeasance (Divestment)
A vested remainder subject to complete defeasance can also come
in the form of a life estate. Indeed, these remainders commonly go by
the name "vested remainders for life." Suppose Cletus gave property
in trust, with the income "to Helen for her life, and then to Carol for
her life, and after her death, distribute the principal to Brandon."
Helen has a life estate, Carol has a vested remainder for life, 37 and
Brandon has an indefeasibly vested remainder. (See Figure 12.)
37. Although Carol must survive Helen in order to enjoy the trust income, that reality is a
function of the limited nature of Carol's interest (a life estate). Because survival is not an added
condition precedent, we classify Carol's remainder as vested, rather than contingent.
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FIGURE 12
Life Estate, Vested Remainder for Life, and
Indefeasibly Vested Remainder
iii. Subject to Open
Sometimes settlors3" will give property to a group of people
whose membership is not fixed at the time of drafting. Use of such a
class gift allows people born after the drafting but before the time for
distribution to share in the gift. For example, Sheppe may give
property "to my wife Mindel for life, and then to our children." We
call the remainder to the children a class gift.39 Because children
born40 later could qualify as class members, we say the class is "open"
during Mindel's life.4
Suppose Sheppe and Mindel have one child, Frieda. Frieda's
remainder is vested; we know who is getting it and there is no
condition precedent. There is, however, the chance that Frieda will
have to share her remainder with a later-born sibling. To account for
that possibility, we say her remainder is vested, subject to partial
divestment. Because this situation arises only when we have an open
class, many lawyers use the shorter term "vested, subject to open."
38. "Settlor" is one term for the person who creates a trust. Other terms are "trustor,"
"grantor," and, if a will creates the trust, "testator."
39. Other common class gifts are to grandchildren, descendants, and nieces and nephews.
For a discussion of how to determine whether a gift is a class gift, see ANDERSEN, supra note 32,
§ 41[A].
40. Adopted children might also qualify for class membership. See ANDERSEN, supra note
32, § 43[A].
41. Discussion of when classes close, so that later potential members do not qualify to take,
is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally ANDERSEN, supra note 32, § 41 [B].
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FIGURE 13
Life Estate, Vested Remainder Subject to
Open and Executory Interest
Figure 13 illustrates Frieda's remainder as a shaded triangle to indicate
the possibility of its being shared. To complete the picture, we often
say that the couple's as yet unborn children have executory interests.42
Of course, this habit is silly, because there are no children to own
anything. Nonetheless, the convention is useful because it reminds us
of what would happen if more children appeared. The executory
interest symbols are shaded to indicate that if children do join the
class, their interests will also be subject to open.
Vested remainders can be subject to complete defeasance and
subject to open at the same time. This situation is common in estate
plans that stretch across three generations. Suppose Sheppe gives
property "to Mindel for life, then to my children for their joint lives,
and then to my grandchildren." Suppose further that Sheppe and
Mindel have a daughter, Frieda, and a grandson, Scott. Mindel has a
life estate. Frieda has a vested remainder for life, subject to open.
Frieda's unborn siblings have executory interests for life, subject to
open. Scott has a vested remainder, subject to open. Scott's unborn
siblings have executory interests, subject to open. (See Figure 14.)
42. They have executory interests because they take by partially divesting their older
siblings.
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FIGURE 14
Life Estate, Vested Remainder for Life
Subject to Open, Vested Remainder Subject to
Open, and Executory Interests
b. Contingent Remainders43
If remainders are not vested, they are contingent. The way to
identify contingent remainders, therefore, is to work through the
definition of vested remainders to see if the interest in question fails
one of those tests. Ask: (1) Is the holder of the remainder someone
who has not yet been born? (2) Is the holder of the remainder
unidentified? (3) Is there any express or implied condition precedent
to that person taking? If the answer to any question is "yes," the
remainder is contingent. When you identify a remainder as contin-
gent, be sure you also identify why it is contingent."
It may seem silly to ask whether someone who holds a remainder
has been born. The question is useful, however, because it helps us to
identify which people will take what interests if someone is born
later." Consider a gift from Joanne "to Scott for life, then to his
children." If Scott has no children, he has a life estate and Joanne has
a reversion. To indicate that things may change, however, we
43. This is the traditional label. The Second Restatement calls these remainders"nonvested." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.4 cmt. b (1936 & Supp. 1995).
44. That way you will know whether the remainder vests if facts change. Also, knowing
why a remainder is contingent is critical to determining its validity under the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
45. Recall how unborn class members can have executory interests that may partially divest
vested remainders, subject to open. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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commonly say that Scott's as yet unborn children have contingent
remainders, contingent upon being born. To indicate the potential
nature of their interest, Figure 15 shows the children's remainders as
a dashed triangle. If Scott later has a child, the child will take a vested
remainder subject to open,46 and Joanne will lose her reversion.
FIGURE 15
Life Estate, Contingent
Remainder, and Reversion
The second way a remainder may be contingent is if the person
holding the remainder is unidentified. Assume Joanne grants property
"to Scott for life, then to Scott's first child to graduate from college."
Assume further that Scott has a child, Taylor, who is in elementary
school. Taylor has a remainder that is contingent upon being
identified as the first of Scott's children to graduate from college. If
Scott has other children before Taylor graduates, they too will have
contingent remainders, because each can join the race to qualify.
Because it is possible that none of Scott's children will graduate from
college and no one will qualify, Joanne has a reversion.47
At this point you might ask what happens if Scott dies while
Taylor is in college, but Taylor later graduates. In this scenario, Scott
has died while Taylor's remainder is still contingent. If the grant were
of realty, the remainder would have been destroyed at common law,
46. See supra Figure 14.
47. A graph of this grant would look the same as Figure 15, supra.
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and Joanne would have kept the property.4" However, this destructi-
bility rule, which is rooted in the doctrine of seisin,49 does not apply
to trusts and has been abolished virtually everywhere. 50  Today,
Joanne almost certainly would keep the property until Taylor
graduated, at which point he would take."1 If there were a trust,
Joanne would probably get the income until Taylor graduated and took
the principal. 52
The third way a remainder can be contingent is for it to be
subject to a condition precedent. Assume Taylor is still in elementary
school. Suppose, however, Joanne uses the language, "to Scott for life,
then to his first child if that child graduates from college." This time
there is no identification problem. Only Taylor can be Scott's "first
child." Taylor still has a contingent remainder, this time subject to the
condition precedent of graduating. Because Taylor's remainder is
contingent, Joanne has a reversion. If Taylor graduates from college
before Scott dies, Taylor's remainder vests, and Joanne loses her
reversion.
A single remainder may be contingent for more than one reason.
Suppose Joanne used the language, "to Scott for life, then to his first
child to graduate from college if that child then attends law school."
Scott's children would have contingent remainders, contingent upon
identification (first to graduate) and a condition precedent (attending
law school). Both conditions would have to be met before the
remainder would vest.
Settlors should, and often do, create alternative gifts in case the
favored person does not qualify to take. Often these gifts take the
form of alternative contingent remainders. Imagine that our hypotheti-
cal family now has two children, Taylor and Todd. Suppose Joanne
48. At Scott's death, Joanne would get the property via her reversion because Taylor had not
yet qualified to take it. Joanne would keep the property because Taylor's contingent remainder
was not powerful enough to divest someone in possession.
Taylor's remainder might also be destroyed by merger. If before Scott died, Joanne gave her
reversion to Scott, then Taylor's contingent remainder would be caught in the squeeze between
Scott's life estate and his reversion. Not powerful enough to prevent the merger, the remainder
would be destroyed.
For short discussions of the destructibility rule for contingent remainders, see BERGIN &
HASKELL, supra note 1, at 77-78, 85-88; MOYNIHAN, supra note 1, at 133-37.
49. "Seisin" is the common law concept that means possession of a freehold. As a force in
our law, it is increasingly irrelevant. For a brief discussion, see MOYNIHAN, supra note 1, at 98-
102.
50. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 3, 272[6] & n.75.
51. At this point, Taylor's interest would be acting like an executory interest.
52. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§§ 163, 182 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
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grants property "to Scott for life, then to Taylor if he survives Scott,
and if he does not, to Todd." Scott has a life estate. Taylor has a
contingent remainder, 53 contingent upon survival. Todd has a
contingent remainder, contingent upon Taylor's non-survival of their
father. To illustrate the alternative nature of the remainders, Figure
16 shows them both snuggled next to the life estate. Either Taylor or
Todd will take at the expiration of the life estate. Joanne has a
reversion.
FIGURE 16
Life Estate, Alternative Contingent
Remainders and Reversion
Why does Joanne have a reversion? Surely Taylor will either
survive Scott and take the remainder, or not survive so Todd will
take.54 The answer, like much of the law of future interests, lies in
history.5" One way to remember the rule is to move the grant back
to the time of the Wars of the Roses. At that time, first one family
and then another would capture the English Crown. In such an
environment, one could commit treason by backing a loser. One
consequence of treason might be forfeiting one's life estates, but not
one's life. Imagine Scott in the Tower of London, having forfeited his
life estate. Neither Taylor nor Todd could take the land, for they had
not yet survived Scott. To account for the fact that possession had to
53. Some would say an "alternative contingent remainder."
54. Because there is no requirement that Todd survive, traditional rules dictate that his
successors take upon his death. For gifts in trust, the UPC would change this rule and require
Todd's survival. 8 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b) (Supp. 1995).
55. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 635, problem 1.
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go to someone, the law recognized Joanne's reversion. If all that
history is too much, simply remember the rule: If there is a contingent
remainder, there is a reversion. 56
Because settlors can give contingent remainders to classes,
contingent remainders can be subject to open. Most classification
schemes ignore that fact until it becomes relevant, but it is important
to know if the remainder is subject to open, whether you say so or
not.57 With this knowledge, you can solve problems as facts change.
Suppose Joanne transfers land "to Scott for life, then to his
children who graduate from college." While Scott is alive and his
children have not yet graduated, the children have contingent
remainders, subject to open. (See Figure 17.) Their unborn younger
siblings have executory interests, subject to open. If one of the
children graduates while Scott is alive, the child's remainder will
become vested, subject to open.38  If Scott then dies and some
children have not graduated, the children who have graduated will hold
fee simple estates, subject to executory interests held by their siblings
who have not graduated."9
56. If a jurisdiction followed the destructibility rule, the reversion would be important. See
supra note 48.
57. Compare the convention of not distinguishing initially between the various ways in which
vested remainders may be subject to complete defeasance. See supra text accompanying note 34.
58. See supra Figure 13.
59. You could graph this situation by shading the executory interests represented in Figure
5, supra. The shading would show that even if these people take, they may still be partially
divested later.
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FIGURE 17
Life Estate, Contingent Remainders Subject to
Open, Executory Interests, and Reversion
c. Vested or Contingent?
When drafters create alternative future interests following a life
estate, it may be particularly difficult to classify those interests.
Usually two possible constructions appear. There may be a vested
remainder and an executory interest,60 or two alternative contingent
remainders and a reversion.61 This section discusses courts' varying
approaches to the problem.
The key to classification in this context is usually the first
remainder. If it is contingent, then an alternative contingent remainder
construction likely will follow. If the first remainder is vested, then the
second interest will probably be an executory interest. Compare two
examples:
Example 1
Wendy grants property to Arlyn for life, then to Glenn if he
graduates from college by age 25, and if not, to Darla.
60. See supra Figure 11.
61. See supra Figure 16.
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Example 2
Wendy grants property to Arlyn for life, then to Glenn, but if he
does not graduate from college by age 25, to Darla.
In Example 1, Glenn and Darla get alternative contingent
remainders and Wendy has a reversion. On the other hand, Example
2 yields Glenn a vested remainder, subject to complete defeasance, and
Darla an executory interest. In the first example, Glenn's remainder
is subject to a condition precedent. In the second, it is subject to a
condition subsequent. How can we tell? Look carefully at the
words.62 In Example 1, the "if he graduates" language directly
follows Glenn's identification. In Example 2, Glenn's name is
followed by a comma, and then a "but" phrase.
However picky such an approach may seem, take it seriously, for
important consequences flow from the distinction between vested and
contingent remainders. Sometimes looking ahead to those conse-
quences can help with the basic classification. In particular, try killing
off the life tenant before the contingency has been resolved. If Arlyn
dies while Glenn is a twenty-year-old undergraduate, who takes? Start
reading after the "to Arlyn for life" language. In Example 1, we read"to Glenn if ... " Neither Glenn nor Darla qualifies as of Arlyn's
death, so Wendy takes. In Example 2, we read "to Glenn, but ....
Glenn has qualified, but may not be able to keep it.
To help decide difficult cases and to further other policies,
construction rules may favor one conclusion over another. Classic
doctrine, often repeated as if by rote, says that the law favors vested
interests." Commentators debate why and whether that principle
makes sense today.64 Of the various rationales they offer for the rule,
two are worth noting here.
First, because a vested construction will tend to limit the number
of future interest holders, it may make property more alienable. The
rule will achieve that result, however, only in a very small number of
62. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 72.
63. See generally SIMES & SMITH, supra note 1, § 573.
64. Although the principle can apply to questions other than survivorship, as a practical
matter, survivorship conditions are quite common and their use dominates the debate. See
generally WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 11.1, at 438-45
(1988); Susan F. French, Imposing a General Survival Requirement on Beneficiaries of Future
Interests: Solving the Problems Caused by the Death of a Beneficiary Before the Time Set for
Distribution, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (1985); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Future Interests: Express and
Implied Conditions of Survival (pts. 1 & 2), 49 CAL. L. REV. 297, 431 (1961); Edward H. Rabin,
The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1965).
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cases. 65  In particular, the alienability rationale has no application to
trusts. The trustee has legal title to the assets and can transfer them
freely despite the variety of equitable interests held by the beneficiaries.
Second, a vested construction will tend to avoid cutting off one
line of a family. This may be the best argument for the rule. Suppose
Eva's will creates a trust for Hope for life with ambiguous remainders
to her children, Carleton and Channey. Suppose also that Channey
survives Eva but dies before Hope. If a court construed Channey's gift
as contingent upon his surviving Hope, Channey's family may lose
out.66 If, as under the traditional rule, Channey need not survive, his
family could be expected to take the remainder by his will or by
intestacy.67  There are other ways to protect Channey's family,
however, without running the property through Channey's estate.6"
Most of the time, reading the words in order will tell you whether
the particular language creates a vested or a contingent remainder. In
marginal cases, courts are likely to repeat, and often follow, the
traditional preference for a vested construction. The stone in which
that preference has been carved is slowly crumbling, however, so
beware of putting too much reliance upon the old rule.69
V. PUTTING IT TOGETHER
Examining different bits of language with an eye to classifying
present and future interests is rather like looking through a kaleido-
scope. Every time you turn it a different way, a new pattern appears.
Because the patterns are endless, generalizations are dangerous. Rare
cases, by definition, will not fit common patterns. Nonetheless, the
following chart may help, if you treat it as a guide, rather than a
mandate.
65. "[T]he rule facilitates alienation only in cases involving legal estates in land where the
interest is an indefeasibly vested estate not subject to open and where ameliorative legislation has
not been enacted." Rabin, supra note 64, at 482.
66. If the gift were a class gift, as the surviving class member, Carleton would take
Channey's share. If this were not a class gift, Channey's share would pass under a residuary
clause or by intestacy. Of course, some of Channey's share could come back to his family by
either route.
67. Channey might also give the property to someone else.
68. We might imply that Channey has a power to appoint the remainder or we could create
alternative gifts by statute. For discussion of these options, see ANDERSEN, supra note 32,§ 43[B][2][c][iii].
69. One recent blow comes from the UPC, which presumes that future interests in trust are
contingent on the beneficiary surviving until the time for distribution. 8 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
707(b) (Supp. 1995).
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PRESENT AND FUTURE ESTATES
Present Interest
In Third Persons
1) Fee simple
absolute
("to B & her
heirs") (modern -"to B")
2) Fee tail
("to B & the heirs
of his body")
3) Defeasible fee
estates
a) Fee simple
determinable
("to B, so long
as...")
b) Fee simple
subject to condi-
tion subsequent
("to B, but if...")
c) Fee simple
subject to an
executory limita-
tion ("to B, but
if...")
4) Life estate
("to B for life")
None None
Reversion
Possibility of
reverter
Right of entry
(power of
termination)
None
Reversion
Vested remainder"*
Contingent remainder
Executory interest
Executory interest
None
Executory interest
Vested remainder"
Contingent remainder
Executory interest
* In many cases it will not be possible for both the grantor and a third person to hold
future interests following the same present interest. This chart indicates some possible
future interests following various present interests.
* Vested remainders may be:
indefeasibly vested
subject to complete defeasance
subject to open
In Grantor
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